Simulation Game for Contract Negotiations

نویسندگان

  • William Dudziak
  • Chris Hendrickson
چکیده

Negotiations are an important activity for engineering managers, but they have received little research or educational attention. An educational simulation game of negotiations in a typical civil engineering context is described in this paper. Experience with the game demonstrates that negotiating skills can be improved. Agreements reached by participants in the game are often inferior in the sense that changes could make both parties better off; identifying mutually advantageous agreements and changes should be an important component of successful negotiations. The game can be used by educators or professional groups.

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تاریخ انتشار 2007