U . S .

This paper reviews both theoretical and empirical studies of financial transmission rights (FTRs) in the major U.S. wholesale power markets and provides a simple illustrative two-stage model to study the competitive behaviors of electricity generators (wholesale power sellers) and load serving entities (LSEs)(wholesale power buyers) and the welfare effects of FTRs in the restructuring U.S. wholesale power market framework. The analysis focuses on a competitive two-node electricity network model where there is one generator and one LSE in each node with linear marginal cost and demand function, supervised by an independent system operator (ISO). In the first-stage of modeling, a no-rights benchmark model is developed to solve for the optimal quantity of power production and consumption and derive the locational marginal price for each node, which serve as the building blocks to solve for the optimal FTR hedge positions in the second-stage model. Once a stochastic shock is introduced, the second-stage model shows that the acquisition of optimal FTRs by the risk averse generators and LSEs will increase and in general will strictly increase the social welfare compared with the case where there is no FTRs available. This result presents a counterexample to the somewhat negative views about FTRs held by other economists in the literature and provides some economic explanations to the fact that FTRs are widely adopted as a financial hedge instrument in the major U.S. wholesale power markets.