Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach Supplementary Material

نویسندگان

  • Daniel Garrett
  • Alessandro Pavan
چکیده

This document contains proofs for Example 1, Propositions 6, and Proposition 7 of the manuscript "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Variational Approach" omitted in the main text. It also contains a brief description of the numerical analysis reported in the main text at the end of Section 4. All numbered items in this document contain the prefix S. Any numbered reference without a prefix refers to an item in the main text. Please refer to the main text for notation and definitions.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015