Review of Equilibrium in economics : scope and limits , edited by Valeria Mosini . London / New York : Routledge

Many scholars have already focused on the use of equilibrium concepts in economics. Consequently, we must consider the extent to which new books on equilibrium improve our understanding of this subject. Equilibrium in economics does much to explain the historical development and scholarly value of equilibrium concepts in the natural and social sciences and contains much historical detail for a book of its size. Chapter 4 by William Dixon and David Wilson should be of great interest this year, as it examines concepts from Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments 250 years after their publication, but it would be engaging even without the usual interest generated by anniversaries. The idea that Ken Arrow and Gerard Debreu completed Smith’s model with general equilibrium analysis always lacked plausibility. It is also important to realize (as argued convincingly in this chapter) that the modern use of homo economicus as a representative agent hearkens back to Thomas Hobbes rather than to Smith. But this use of Hobbes’s homo economicus is even more important than indicated in chapter 4. Modern economists have exported equilibrium concepts to political science, via public choice theory. The Hobbesian assumptions in public choice were not made simply by chance: early public choice theorists were explicit about the influence of Hobbes on their work, and Hobbesian issues remain relevant in public choice theory today. Thus, Hobbesian behavioral assumptions have found their way back into political science through economics. Adam Smith was not the only one who rejected Hobbes’s view of human nature. In chapter 5, Richard van den Berg examines the work of Achilles Nicholas Isnard, published in 1781. Isnard is largely unknown to modern economists, yet many of his ideas are familiar. Isnard combined mathematical modeling of markets with discussion of how