Operationalizing the Section 5 Retrogression Standard of the Voting Rights Act in the Light of Georgia v. Ashcroft: Social Science Perspectives on Minority Influence, Opportunity and Control

IN GEORGIA V. ASHCROFT, 539 U. S. 461 (2003), by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court laid down a new interpretation of the meaning of the retrogression standard in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion replaces the exclusive focus in earlier Section 5 jurisprudence on reduction in the realistic opportunity of minority voters1 to elect candidates of choice2 with what is commonly described as a dualistic approach that allows jurisdictions to determine which of two variants of retrogression they wish to claim their plan avoids: (1) retrogression in ability of minorities to elect candidates of choice, or (2) retrogression in the magnitude of overall minority influence.3 Although the years prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft had already seen both important changes in how the Section 5 standard was legally defined and in how the U.S. Department