Technical Appendix of Sinha and Greenleaf "The Impact of Discrete Bidding and Bidder Aggressiveness on Sellers' Strategies in
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چکیده
All variables and functions are real valued. Assumption 1: f(v)/(1-F(v)) is strictly monotonically increasing in v (see Footnote 4 for discussion). Fact 1: Suppose v(n-1), the second highest order statistic of n random variables drawn from F(v), is known. Then the distribution of the highest order statistic v(n) is the distribution F(v) truncated to the left at v(n-1) and normalized (Arnold, Balakrishnan, and Nagaraja, 1992, Theorem 2.4.1, p. 23). Definition 1: In discrete bid auction, the set of permissible bids is Θ = {sa,sa+I,...,sa+KI}, where sa is the starting auction bid, and K is an integer ≥2. Here sa+KI ≤ v 1. Definition and Properties of ℘(⋅) Here, we define ℘(⋅) formally, based upon the discussion of bidding aggressiveness in the text (pgs. 8-9). Let ℘(j)Aggressive denote the bid probability for a relatively aggressive Bn, recalling that the "bid probability" is the probability that Bn obtains the current bid when j other bidders also remain. In a parallel manner, ℘(j)Neutral and ℘(j)Unaggressive describe the bid probabilities for a neutral and an unaggressive Bn. Further, note that ℘(⋅) is a function of j and some other parameter, the latter directly representing aggressiveness in any functional form appropriate for ℘(⋅). We require that ℘(⋅) satisfy the following three properties: (a) For any given j, ℘(j)Aggressive > ℘(j)Neutral > ℘(j)Unaggressive, with the inequalities being strict; and that ℘(j) is strictly increasing as aggressiveness increases, regardless of the type of aggressiveness. Note ℘(j)Neutral=1/(j+1). (b) (j+1)℘(j) be nondecreasing in j for aggressiveness, nonincreasing in j for unaggressiveness, and constant in j for neutrality, for all j corresponding to all n. This sufficient condition ensures that for each bidder, ℘(j) 1/(j+1) is always either > 0, or < 0, or = 0, for all j. Also, note that different bidders are allowed to have different types of aggressiveness. (c) ℘(j) is not a constant in j for aggressiveness, neutrality, or unaggressiveness, for all j. It follows from properties (a) and (c) that ℘(j) is a monotonic function of the parameter directly representing aggressiveness, for a given j. For example, γ is that parameter in the numerical examples in the text §5. Since the proofs do not require that parameter explicitly, it does not appear as an argument in ℘(⋅).
منابع مشابه
The Impact of Discrete Bidding and Bidder Aggressiveness on Sellers’ Strategies in Open English Auctions: Reserves and Covert Shilling
In practice, the rules in most open English auctions require participants to raise bids by a sizeable, discrete amount. Furthermore, some bidders are typically more aggressive in seeking to become the “current bidder” during competitive bidding. Most auction theory, however, has assumedbidders can place any tiny “continuous” bid increase, and recommend as optimal the tiniest possible increase. ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2001