Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

نویسندگان

  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Olivier Donni
چکیده

Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters λ that may affect agents’ preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is reached, and if so the individual shares) and the environment (including the size of the pie) are known, but neither the agents’ utilities nor their threat points. Assuming that the agents adopt a Nash bargaining solution, we investigate the empirical content of this assumption. We first show that in the most general framework, any outcome can be rationalized as a Nash solution. However, if (i) the size of the pie y does not influence the players’ threat points and (ii) there exist (at least) two parameters λ1 and λ2 that are player-specific, in the sense that λi does not influence the utility or the threat point of player j ≠ i, then Nash bargaining generates strong testable restrictions. Moreover, the underlying structure of the bargaining, i.e., the players’ utility and threat point functions, can be recovered under slightly more demanding conditions. JEL Classification: C71, C78 Keywords: bargaining game, Nash solution, testability, identifiability, cardinal utility Corresponding author: Olivier Donni University of Cergy-Pontoise 33, Boulevard du Port 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex France Email: [email protected] * Paper presented at seminars in Chicago and Paris. We thank participants, and in particular Jaap Abbring, Bernard Fortin and Jim Heckman for useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the NSF (grant) and the FQRSC is gratefully acknowledged. Errors are ours. I passed by his garden, and marked, with one eye, How the Owl and the Panter were sharing a pie: The Panther took pie-crust, and gravy, and meat, While the Old had the dish as its share of the treat. When the pie was all …nished, the Owl, as a boon, Was kindly permitted to pocket the spoon: While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl, And concluded the banquet by... Lewis Caroll (Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 1866)

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel

This research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model. In a departure from the standard empirical channel literature, which assumes that manufacturers set wholesale prices unilaterally, we explicitly model the negot...

متن کامل

Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach

Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest sha...

متن کامل

The Impact of Previous Action on Bargaining - An Experiment on the Emergence of Preferences for Fairness Norms

The communication of participants to identify an acceptable bargaining outcome in the Nash bargaining game is all about fairness norms. Participants introduce fairness norms which yield a better outcome for themselves in order to convince the other participant of their bargaining proposal. Typically, these fairness norms are in line with theoretical predictions, which support a wide variety of ...

متن کامل

Commitment in Alternating O¤ers Bargaining

We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each bargaining round, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique outcome consistent with common belief in future rationality (Perea, 2010), or more restrictively subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,...

متن کامل

Employing a Multi-Criteria Approach under Bankruptcy Conditions for Optimal Allocation of Shared Water Resources through Using Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Method

Management based on the flexibility, fairness, and sustainability characteristics of water resources may play a key role in preventing the continuation of the crisis process as well as reducing water users’ conflict. In the present research, the framework for the optimal allocation of shared water resources was presented using a combination of bankruptcy concepts and asymmetric Nash bargaining....

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2005