Formal Veriication of Safety-critical Hybrid Systems ?

This paper investigates how formal techniques can be used for the analysis and veriication of hybrid systems 1,5,7,16] | systems involving both discrete and continuous behavior. The motivation behind such research lies in the inherent similarity of the hierarchical and decentralized control strategies of hybrid systems and the communication and operation protocols used for distributed systems in computer science. This paper focuses on the use of hybrid I/O automata 11,12] to model, analyze, and verify safety-critical hybrid systems that use emergency control subsystems to prevent the violation of their safety requirements. The paper is split into two parts. First, we develop an abstract model of a protector | an emergency control component that guarantees that the physical plant at hand adheres to a particular safety requirement. The abstract protector model specialized to a particular physical plant and a particular safety requirement constitutes the speciication of a protector that enforces the particular safety property for the particular physical plant. The correctness proof of the abstract protector model leads to simple correctness proofs of the implementations of particular protectors. In addition, the composition of independent protectors, and even dependent protectors under mild conditions, guarantees the conjunction of the safety properties guaranteed by the individual protectors being composed. Second, as a case study, we specialize the aforementioned abstract protector model to simpliied versions of the personal rapid transit system (PRT 2000 TM) under development at Raytheon Corporation and verify the correctness of overspeed and collision avoidance protectors. Such correctness proofs are repeated for track topologies ranging from a single track to a directed graph of tracks involving Y-shaped merges and diverges.