Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case
نویسندگان
چکیده
A range of empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates the importance of buyers’ financial constraints in auctions. Financial constraints are used by Cramton (1995) to explain some bidders’ exit decisions in the personal communications services (PCS) auctions and by Genesove (1993) to explain the end-of-day drop in prices at used car auctions. The importance of financial constraints is also recognized in auction design. The U.S.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 39 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002