Multiagent Learning and Optimality Criteria in Repeated Game Self-play

نویسندگان

  • Andriy Burkov
  • Brahim Chaib-draa
چکیده

We present a multiagent learning approach to satisfy any given optimality criterion in repeated game self-play. Our approach is opposed to classical learning approaches for repeated games: namely, learning of equilibrium, Paretoefficient learning, and their variants. The comparison is given from a practical (or engineering) standpoint, i.e., from a point of view of a multiagent system designer whose goal is to maximize the system’s overall performance according to a given optimality criterion. Extensive experiments in a wide variety of repeated games demonstrate the efficiency of our approach.

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تاریخ انتشار 2009