Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods.
نویسندگان
چکیده
The production, consumption, and exploitation of common resources ranging from extracellular products in microorganisms to global issues of climate change refer to public goods interactions. Individuals can cooperate and sustain common resources at some cost or defect and exploit the resources without contributing. This generates a conflict of interest, which characterizes social dilemmas: Individual selection favors defectors, but for the community, it is best if everybody cooperates. Traditional models of public goods do not take into account that benefits of the common resource enable cooperators to maintain higher population densities. This leads to a natural feedback between population dynamics and interaction group sizes as captured by "ecological public goods." Here, we show that the spatial evolutionary dynamics of ecological public goods in "selection-diffusion" systems promotes cooperation based on different types of pattern formation processes. In spatial settings, individuals can migrate (diffuse) to populate new territories. Slow diffusion of cooperators fosters aggregation in highly productive patches (activation), whereas fast diffusion enables defectors to readily locate and exploit these patches (inhibition). These antagonistic forces promote coexistence of cooperators and defectors in static or dynamic patterns, including spatial chaos of ever-changing configurations. The local environment of cooperators and defectors is shaped by the production or consumption of common resources. Hence, diffusion-induced self-organization into spatial patterns not only enhances cooperation but also provides simple mechanisms for the spontaneous generation of habitat diversity, which denotes a crucial determinant of the viability of ecological systems.
منابع مشابه
Pattern formation and chaos in spatial ecological public goodsgames.
Cooperators and defectors can coexist in ecological public goods games. When the game is played in two-dimensional continuous space, a reaction diffusion model produces highly irregular dynamics, in which cooperators and defectors survive in ever-changing configurations (Wakano et al., 2009. Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, 7910-7914). The dynamics is rel...
متن کاملEcological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcation.
The Public Goods Game is one of the most popular models for studying the origin and maintenance of cooperation. In its simplest form, this evolutionary game has two regimes: defection goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is smaller than the interaction group size N, whereas cooperation goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is larger than the interaction group size N. Hauert...
متن کاملEvolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games.
The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by c...
متن کاملAn Investigation into the Hegelian Government's Functions in Organizing the Political Economy of Geographical Space
Aims & Backgrounds :The political economy of space studies the spatial patterns of capital, public goods, infrastructure, and how to adopt the necessary measures for the continuation of capital accumulation by political actors. Obviously, among different frames of political economy, the state-oriented approach seeks to study the role of actors and governing institutions in who distribution of p...
متن کاملCheater-altruist synergy in immunopathogenic ecological public goods games
Much research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behavior. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behavior can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
دوره 106 19 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009