Selfish Task Allocation
نویسنده
چکیده
Recently there has been a lot of interest in problems at the intersection of Game Theory, Economics, and Computer Science. For example, there are interesting developments concerning algorithms for equilibria and cost sharing, algorithmic mechanism design, and the efficiency of systems with selfish users [17]. In this note, I will focus on the last area and in particular on the price of anarchy of scheduling or task allocation. I will discuss the issues of this area, mention the central results, and suggest some open problems. This is definitely not a review paper: My aim is to stimulate the reader, not to provide complete coverage of the area. The presentation favors simplicity to preciseness, examples to formal presentation, and intuition to rigor.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Bulletin of the EATCS
دوره 81 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003