Two Approaches to Belief Revision Ted Shear and Branden Fitelson
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چکیده
In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for revising qualitative (viz., “full”) beliefs. The first method is a naïve Bayesian one, which operates via conditionalization and the minimization of expected inaccuracy. The second method is the AGM approach to belief revision. Our aim here is to provide the most straightforward explanation of the ways in which these two methods agree and disagree with each other. Ultimately, we conclude that AGM may be seen as more epistemically risk-seeking than EUT from the Bayesian perspective.
منابع مشابه
Two Approaches to Belief Revision*
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تاریخ انتشار 2015