Strengthening the BTWC

©2003 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORGANIZATION EMBO reports VOL 4 | special issue | 2003 S61 Public health in reverse; this term has been applied to the deliberate use of microorganisms to cause and spread disease (Harris & Paxman, 1982, p. xii). Biological warfare is not only a perversion of science; it goes against the very heart of human efforts to reduce and eliminate infectious disease as a scourge of society. The developed world had assumed that the impact of natural infectious diseases had been eliminated by, among other things, clean water, antibiotics and vaccinations; we know now that this is far from the truth. Since the early 1970s, at least 30 previously unknown infectious diseases, have been identified for which there is as yet no fully effective treatment (US Department of Health, 2002). One could also be forgiven for believing that the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) had eliminated the threat posed by the deliberate release of these microorganisms. Unfortunately, since the convention came into force in 1975, the historical record has been unequivocal. Both the former Soviet Union and Iraq have pursued major clandestine bioweapons programmes concealed both within government and, ostensibly, civil and academic facilities, such as vaccine and other pharmaceutical plants. The misuse of ‘dual-use’ knowledge, facilities and technologies and the proliferation of potential biological weapons remains a risk, despite the existence of the BTWC, and underscores the need to find more effective ways of combating and deterring the acquisition, possession and use of offensive bioweapon capabilities. We should not forget that the term ‘bioweapons’ applies to the misuse of microorganisms to cause disease or harm to humans, animals and plants—indeed, the threat to crop monocultures, food supplies and agricultural trade should not be underestimated (Chalk, 2001; Wheelis et al., 2002). A major stumbling block with the current BTWC is that it contains weak compliance provisions. Article VI of the convention allows a state to take serious cases of concern to the United Nation (UN)’s Security Council, which would then decide whether to dispatch an investigation team to establish the nature and source of the alleged use. But the veto right of five of its members—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—has been a deterrent: in the 27 years of the convention, no compliance concern has ever been taken to the Security Council. Thus, many state parties realized from the outset that the BTWC was not as strong as it could be. There have, therefore, been several attempts to strengthen the convention since the first review conference in 1980, and the UK has tried during these negotiations to include mechanisms to investigate any alleged use of bioweapons. This has been a slow and relatively unproductive process, and last year witnessed the failure of a six-year negotiation to elaborate a protocol to the convention. This would have included provisions for the declaration of certain facilities, visits to those facilities, investigations into cases of suspected cheating, including alleged use and suspicious outbreaks of disease, and provisions for greater scientific and technological cooperation in the life sciences. A new organization would have been established to implement the protocol (BWC/Ad Hoc Group/CRP.8, 2001). In addition, the Fifth Review Conference, which took place last November and December, broke up because of disagreements over the nature of future efforts to strengthen the convention. Nevertheless, it was not all in vain. A range of alternative measures to strengthen the BTWC were proposed at a conference by the European Union, the USA and South Africa, and some were included in the draft Final Declaration. Our response to bioterrorism depends very much on the instruments already in place to counter infectious diseases in general. The BTWC could help to combat existing and emerging diseases, but is it really an appropriate mechanism for such efforts? This article will explain why it has an important role, and why the BTWC needs to be strengthened to be able to do so. Its relevance to infectious disease comes from its basic objective, which is to ensure that microorganisms and toxins are not used as weapons to cause disease, death or other harm—something that is repugnant to the conscience of mankind, as stated in the convention’s preamble. Article X of the convention thus obliges State Parties to contribute, individually or with other states or international organizations, to the further development and application of biology to prevent diseases. It is therefore worth taking some time to review other international efforts in the fight against infectious diseases before moving on to the BTWC.