Pinocchio: Incentives for Honest Participation in Distributed Trust Management

نویسندگان

  • Alberto Fernandes
  • Evangelos Kotsovinos
  • Sven Östring
  • Boris Dragovic
چکیده

In this paper, we introduce a framework for providing incentives for honest participation in global-scale distributed trust management infrastructures. Our system can improve the quality of information supplied by these systems by reducing free-riding and encouraging honesty. Our approach is twofold: (1) we provide rewards for participants that advertise their experiences to others, and (2) impose the credible threat of halting the rewards, for a substantial amount of time, for participants who consistently provide suspicious feedback. For this purpose we develop an honesty metric which can indicate the accuracy of feedback.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004