Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on twoperiod moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 75 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012