A New Method of the Single Transferable Vote and its Axiomatic Justification
نویسندگان
چکیده
We propose a new method of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and give a unified way to describe classic procedures (Gregory Method, Inclusive Gregory Method and Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method) as an iterative procedure. A modification for quota definition is proposed which improves theoretical properties of the procedures. The method is justified by a new set of axioms. It is shown that this procedure extends the Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method with the modified definition of quota and random equiprobable selection of winning coalition on each iteration. The results are extended to the methods allowing fractional number of votes.
منابع مشابه
A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification
We propose a new method for conducting Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections and provide a unified method for describing classic STV procedures (the Gregory Method, the Inclusive Gregory Method and the Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method) as an iterative procedure. We also propose a modification for quota definition that improves the theoretical properties of the procedures. The method is just...
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