The Illusion of Discretion

Recent writers have invoked the idea that epistemic rationality gives us options in an attempt to show that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality. Speci cally, they suggest that when the evidence for p is su cient but not conclusive, it would be rational either to believe p or to be agnostic on p, and they hold that we can in these cases e ectively decide to form either attitude without irrationality. This paper argues against the version of epistemic permissivism (“Discretion”) invoked by these writers and shows that other defensible permissivisms do not support their cause. It proceeds as follows. §1 introduces the issue. §2 undermines two arguments for Discretion and uses some lessons from their failure to mount an argument against Discretion. §3 presents a further argument against Discretion. §4 o ers an error theory to explain our misguided attraction to Discretion. §5 explains why other defensible permissivisms do not help to support the view that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality.