Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 71 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011