Kmth Price Sealed-bid Auctions with General Independent Values and Equilibrium Linear Mark-ups

(2014) kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear markups. Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source: ABSTRACT A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate the bidder's expected profit and auctioner's expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value (GIV) and Independent Private Value (IPV) km th price sealed bid auction (where the m th bidder wins at the k th bid payment) using a linear (affine) markup function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions (FPA) and Second Price Auctions (SPA) are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.