Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design

Nash equilibrium strategy in the deregulated power industry and comparing its lost welfare with Iran wholesale electricity market

With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants’ behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal bidding behavior to the Iran wholesale electricity market as a restructured electric power industry and mode...

Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design

Uncertainity in Mechanism Design ∗

We consider a simple mechanism design problem with private values in which each agent perceives Knightian uncertainty over his opponents’ types. Uncertainty is formalized using incomplete preferences as in Bewley (1986). We show that the seller can extract all gains from trade with a direct mechanism in which truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium, in the sense that no buyer has a unilateral incen...

Commentary: Nash equilibrium and dynamics

Article history: Received 4 October 2010 Available online 9 November 2010 JEL classification: C70 C72 C73

Algorithmic Mechanism Design of Evolutionary Computation

We consider algorithmic design, enhancement, and improvement of evolutionary computation as a mechanism design problem. All individuals or several groups of individuals can be considered as self-interested agents. The individuals in evolutionary computation can manipulate parameter settings and operations by satisfying their own preferences, which are defined by an evolutionary computation algo...