An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games
نویسنده
چکیده
I adapt a reduction process introduced by Serrano and Volij (1998) so that the reduced games of convex-valued games are convex-valued. I use the corresponding consistency property and its converse to axiomatize the inner core for games that are convex-valued, non-level and smooth.
منابع مشابه
Axiomatizing core extensions
We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core ([Guesnerie and Oddou, 1979] and [Sun, Trockel, and Yang, 2008]) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The la...
متن کاملA Note on an Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
As shown by Peleg (1993), the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness, individual rationality, superadditivity, the weak reduced game property, the converse reduced game property, and weak symmetry. It was not known whether weak symmetry was logically independent. With the help of a certain transitive 4-person TU game, it is shown that weak symmetry is redundant in this result. He...
متن کاملAKIRA OKADA and EYAL WINTER A NON-COOPERATIVE AXIOMATIZATION OF THE CORE
We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most o...
متن کاملReasoning about rationality
We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a class of logics appropriate for reasoning about the rationality of players in games, and show that essentially the same axiomatization applies to a very wide class of decision rules. We also consider epistemic representations of games in which players may be uncertain as to what decision rules their opponents are using, and define in this con...
متن کاملAn Axiomatization of the Prekernel of Nontransferable Utility Games*
We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency, converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems. The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with the same axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004