Why do we punish groups? High entitativity promotes moral suspicion

a r t i c l e i n f o People typically take a moral deservingness perspective when deciding on appropriate punishment for intentional wrongdoings committed by individuals. Considerably less is known about how people reason about wrongdoings committed by groups, even though there are fundamental differences in how people perceive individuals versus groups. The present research examined perceived entitativity, the degree to which a group is perceived to be a unified, single agent, as a potential determinant of moral reasoning about transgressions committed by groups. We found that participants recommended more severe punishments for high entitativity (vs. low entitativity) perpetrator groups, particularly in the presence of morally mitigating circumstances that typically lessen punitiveness. This effect was mediated by perceptions of greater moral accountability in high-entitativity groups. Thus, justice is not equal for all groups. Implications for retributive justice and the criminal justice system are discussed. Introduction A wealth of research has examined people's judgments of immoral acts committed by individuals, focusing on intuitions about what is and is not moral (Haidt, 2001) and on motivations to punish wrong-doers (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Considerably less is known about how people reason about transgressions committed by groups. Indeed, the majority of research on moral psychology has taken an individualist approach, treating the individual as the fundamental unit of moral value and focusing on principles of individual rights as guidelines for moral judgment (Haidt, 2008). However, there are fundamental differences in how people perceive, process information about, and interact with individuals as compared groups are routinely evaluated more negatively than others, with low-status groups facing discrimination cross-culturally (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For instance, Black Americans are judged more harshly in legal contexts and incarcerated at substantially higher rates than White Americans (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997), indicating that justice is not equal for all. In the present research, we examined the hypothesis that, independent of the social context of specific group memberships, a group's perceived structure may impact people's moral judgments of transgressions committed by the group. We focused specifically on perceived entitativity, the degree to which a group is perceived to be a unified, single agent as opposed to a mere collection of individuals (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), as a determinant of moral reasoning about group transgressions. Research on retributive justice has provided considerable evidence that people take a " just deserts " or moral deservingness perspective when deciding …