Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two types of indicator to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither type of indicator depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.
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