Exit Polls and Voter Turnout
نویسندگان
چکیده
We set up a model of elections or referendums with two alternatives to study how voter turnout and election outcomes are a¤ected by the publication of exit polls on election day. We nd that the introduction of an exit poll inuences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is published, but the sign of the e¤ect is generally ambiguous. The fact that exit polls inuence the incentive to vote before they are even published is sometimes overlooked in the debate on their desirability. We show that this can lead to premature conclusions about the impact of exit polls on election outcomes.
منابع مشابه
Exit Polls, Turnout, and Bandwagon Voting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by abo...
متن کاملLearning in Elections and Voter Turnout
Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple Nash equilibria. Many of these equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that is unlikely to be reached in real elections. At the same time, mechanisms like pre-election polls exist to shape the beliefs of voters about expected turnout. We combine the...
متن کاملDo Voting Advice Applications Have an Effect on Electoral Participation and Voter Turnout? Evidence from the 2007 Swiss Federal Elections
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) render a valuable platform for tackling one of democracy’s central challenges: low voter turnout. Studies indicate that lack of information and cost-benefit considerations cause voters to abstain from voting. VAAs are online voting assistance tools which match own political preferences with those of candidates and parties in elections. By assisting voters in th...
متن کاملA Rational Choice Theory of Voter Turnout
London Business School · Regent’s Park · London NW1 4SA · UK · [email protected] January 3, 2012. Abstract. I consider a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are instrumentally motivated. The unique equilibrium predicts substantial turnout under reasonable conditions, and greater tur...
متن کاملOn the Rational Choice Theory of Voter Turnout
I consider a two-candidate plurality-rule election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are instrumentally motivated. The unique equilibrium predicts significant turnout under reasonable parameter configurations, and greater turnout for the underdog offsets the expected advantage of the perceived leader. I...
متن کامل