Binding Promises and Cooperation Among Strangers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Money and trust among strangers.
What makes money essential for the functioning of modern society? Through an experiment, we present evidence for the existence of a relevant behavioral dimension in addition to the standard theoretical arguments. Subjects faced repeated opportunities to help an anonymous counterpart who changed over time. Cooperation required trusting that help given to a stranger today would be returned by a s...
متن کاملCooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future
We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even ...
متن کاملForthcoming American Journal of Sociology Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange^
In this research we explore anonymous, one-shot exchanges among “neighbors” and among “strangers” in four countries. Specifically, we compare levels of trust and reciprocity in a direct-reciprocal (dyadic) exchange, with those in network generalized exchanges among experimentally manipulated groups’ members (neighbors) or random experimental participants (strangers). We demonstrate that levels ...
متن کاملDirect and indirect punishment among strangers in the field.
Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholdi...
متن کاملCooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
The amount of institutional intervention necessary to secure efficiency-enhancing cooperation in markets and organizations, in circumstances where interactions take place among essentially strangers, depends critically on the amount of information informal reputation mechanisms need transmit. Models based on subgame perfection find that the information necessary to support cooperation is recurs...
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تاریخ انتشار 2016