Ignoring Qualifications (secundum Quid) as a Subfallacy of Hasty Generalization

In the experience of teaching courses on informal logic and argumentation, one finds that the fault of being overly rigid and absolutistic in thinking, of being too insensitive to the defeasible nature of much ordinary reasoning, is an important type of error. In a critical discussion, it is important for an arguer to be open to refutation, to admitting her argument was wrong, should convincing evidence be brought forward by the opposing side. It would be nice to have a name for this general type of failure in argument, and for the subfallacies or special failures that come under it. The idea of neglecting qualifications, or legitimate exceptions to a plausible generalization in a particular case, is a clear and simple kind of failure that covers this gap. It is quite generally clear to students, from their personal experience, at least in general, what kind of error this is.(1) On some accounts, the traditional informal fallacy of secundum quid (originally from the Aristotelian fallacy para to pe , meaning 'in a certain respect')(2) fills this bill, referring to the fault of not paying attention to qualifications that would invalidate the use of a general proposition in a particular case. For example, in the Dictionary of Philosophy (Runes, 1964, p. 287) we find: