Ambient inspections in environmental enforcement : an extension
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider an inspection game between an arbitrary number of polluting rms and an agency who can choose to monitor ambient pollution. We obtain an equilibrium where all rms comply with the same probability and where the inspection agency inspects all rms individually if ambient pollution exceeds an endogenous threshold. If the ne for noncompliance is high enough, the agency's costs are lower then if it does not monitor ambient pollution. If the rms believe the agency's announcement that it conducts ambient inspections, their probability of compliance can be so high that the agency will want to deviate.
منابع مشابه
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