On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences
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چکیده
We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.
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تاریخ انتشار 2015