Spatial effect on stochastic dynamics of bistable evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population dependence of the lifetimes is qualitatively different in these two models. Our result indicates that spatial structure can accelerate the transitions between metastable states. PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 87.23.Kg
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تاریخ انتشار 2014