Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
Article history: Received 25 April 2011 Available online 26 June 2015 JEL classification: D72 D44
منابع مشابه
Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent and both players are budget-constrained. We extend the results for all-pay auctions with complete information, and show that in our class of all-pay auctions with asymmetric information, su¢ ciently high (...
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In an article published in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483–521] analyze symmetric and asymmetric investment games similar to two-player all-pay auctions with bid caps. In th...
متن کاملThe all-pay auction when a committee awards the prize*
There is very little work on the equilibrium of the all-pay auction when the prize is awarded by two or more people. I consider an all-pay auction under committee administration with caps on the bids of the contestants. I show that for any number of committee members and contestants, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the contestants bid an amount equal to a suitably chosen cap. ...
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We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.
متن کاملEvolutionary dynamics of biological auctions.
Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits ...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 92 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015