Automated Mechanism Design in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information: Framework and Applications
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information. Our approach yields optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms in two application domains using various objective functions. By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we show that ours is a promising approach to parametric design of indirect mechanisms.
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