Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

نویسندگان

  • Hamidou Tembine
  • Eitan Altman
  • Rachid El Azouzi
  • Yezekael Hayel
چکیده

This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous reward which depends on its state and the population’s profile, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless networks with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolutionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equilibria.

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تاریخ انتشار 2008