Bribery and voter control under voting-rule uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study manipulative actions, especially bribery and control, under “voting-rule uncertainty,” which means that there are two or more rules that may be used to determine the election’s outcome. Among our highlights are that we show a new case in which “ties matter,” we link manipulation and bribery in a way that shows many cases of single-bribery to be in polynomial time, we explore the relations between the bribery and control complexities of the underlying systems and their “uncertain” combination, and we obtain many results about the complexity of natural voting rules under votingrule uncertainty, most notably regarding control by adding voters under election families of the form {k1-Approval, . . . ,kl-Approval, k̂1-Veto, . . . , k̂l̂-Veto}.
منابع مشابه
Manipulation under voting rule uncertainty
An important research topic in the field of computational social choice is the complexity of various forms of dishonest behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. While much of the work on this topic assumes that the cheating party has full information about the election, recently there have been a number of attempts to gauge the complexity of non-truthful behavior under uncertainty ...
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An important research topic in the field of computational social choice is the complexity of various forms of dishonest behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. While much of the work on this topic assumes that the cheating party has full information about the election, recently there have been a number of attempts to gauge the complexity of non-truthful behavior under uncertainty ...
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