Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
نویسنده
چکیده
Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design. JEL numbers: D23, D82, D86, L22.
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