Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nash equilibrium strategy in the deregulated power industry and comparing its lost welfare with Iran wholesale electricity market
With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants’ behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal bidding behavior to the Iran wholesale electricity market as a restructured electric power industry and mode...
متن کاملUncertainity in Mechanism Design ∗
We consider a simple mechanism design problem with private values in which each agent perceives Knightian uncertainty over his opponents’ types. Uncertainty is formalized using incomplete preferences as in Bewley (1986). We show that the seller can extract all gains from trade with a direct mechanism in which truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium, in the sense that no buyer has a unilateral incen...
متن کاملAlgorithmic Mechanism Design of Evolutionary Computation
We consider algorithmic design, enhancement, and improvement of evolutionary computation as a mechanism design problem. All individuals or several groups of individuals can be considered as self-interested agents. The individuals in evolutionary computation can manipulate parameter settings and operations by satisfying their own preferences, which are defined by an evolutionary computation algo...
متن کاملPrice differentiation and control in the Kelly mechanism
The design and implementation of resource allocation and pricing for computing and network resources are crucial for system and user performance. Among various designing objectives, we target on maximizing the social welfare, i.e., the summation of all user utilities. The challenge comes from the fact that users are autonomous and their utilities are unknown to the system designer. Under the Ke...
متن کاملNash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents’ interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient condi...
متن کامل