The multiple hierarchical legislatures in representative democracy ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Multiple hierarchical models of representative democracies in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives and state representatives a president, reduces the number of electors a representative is answerable for, and therefore, considering each level separately, these models could come closer to direct democracy. In this paper we show that worst case policy bias increases with the number of hierarchical levels. This also means that the opportunities of a gerrymanderer increase in the number of hierarchical levels.
منابع مشابه
Representative Democracy: Public Policy and Midwestern Legislatures in the Late Nineteenth Century
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تاریخ انتشار 2012