Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: an Experiment on Certification
نویسنده
چکیده
Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject’s behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presents a taxonomy of certification, and provides experimental evidence supporting the commonly observed use of rankings in certificates, as well as the restriction of awareness by certifiers to increase revenue. Regulatory implications are discussed.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2002