Tamper resistance of AES: models, attacks and countermeasures
نویسنده
چکیده
2007 ii ≪Timmy & Finn – Sonnenkinder, die auch im Regen lachen≫ Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Johannes Blömer, for his great support and continuous encouragement in writing this thesis. Among other topics, he introduced me into the field of tamper resistance and side channel attacks and supplied me with new interesting and challenging problems and ideas. Johannes allowed me great freedom to do my research and he always took time to discuss the ongoing progress. His comments and suggestions were always very helpful to improve my work. I am also truly indebted to my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Joachim von zur Gathen, who sparked my interest in cryptography. The opportunity to join his working group allowed me to deepen my research in this fascinating area. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Jean-Pierre Seifert, the coordinator of our joint project with the Intel Corporation. The cooperation with Intel not only implied financial support of my research but also provided valuable insights in recent cryptographic problems. This thesis would not have been possible without the generous support of the " Institut für Industriemathematik " of the University of Paderborn. Special thanks go to Tanja Bürger and Dr. Robert Preis who were very helpful in handling all the administrative obstacles.
منابع مشابه
Buying AES Design Resistance with Speed and Energy
Fault and power attacks are two common ways of extracting secrets from tamper-resistant chips. Although several protections have been proposed to thwart these attacks, resistant designs usually claim significant area or speed overheads. Furthermore, circuit-level countermeasures are usually not reconfigurable at runtime. This paper exploits the AES’ algorithmic features to propose low-cost and ...
متن کاملMontgomery Residue Representation Fault-Tolerant Computation in GF(2k)
In this paper, we are concerned with protecting elliptic curve computation in a tamper proof device by protecting finite field computation against active side channel attacks, i.e., fault attacks. We propose residue representation of the field elements for fault tolerant Montgomery residue representation multiplication algorithm, by providing fault models for fault attacks, and countermeasures ...
متن کاملFault Based Cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
In this paper we describe several fault attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). First, using optical fault induction attacks as recently publicly presented by Skorobogatov and Anderson [SA], we present an implementation independent fault attack on AES. This attack is able to determine the complete 128-bit secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smartcard by generating 128 faulty cipher t...
متن کاملInformation Leakage Attacks Against Smart Card Implementations of Cryptographic Algorithms and Countermeasures A Survey
Every practical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm represents a physical device possessing potential side channels not covered by the security models of theoretical cryptography. Hence, even provable secure cryptographic algorithms may be attacked due to leakage of information. Smart cards and security ICs are often used as tamper-proof security devices. To prevent an attacker from exp...
متن کاملGarbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs - (Full Version)
The power of side-channel leakage attacks on cryptographic implementations is evident. Today’s practical defenses are typically attack-specific countermeasures against certain classes of side-channel attacks. The demand for a more general solution has given rise to the recent theoretical research that aims to build provably leakage-resilient cryptography. This direction is, however, very new an...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007