Emotionality and perceptual defense.

During the past decade, a number of experimental investigations have progressively revealed the so-called "dynamic," or motivational, aspects of perceptual behavior. No longer do we view perception as organized solely in terms of the structural characteristics of stimulus objects or the frequency with which the individual has been exposed to these objects. Perceptions are structured not only with respect to the limiting stimulus conditions, but also with regard to the possibilities of reward (11, 12), need fulfillment (1, 7), attitudinal orientation (10), potential anxiety (4), symbolic value (3), and release from tension (2), to mention just a few. In order to describe such facts as the perceptual selection and accentuation of valued objects and the elimination or distortion of inimical stimulus objects, it has been found convenient to invoke mechanisms of sensitization, defense, and value resonance (10), vigilance (2), and primitivation (4). Finally, playing host to these varied and intricate functions is the "ego," in whose service, presumably, the various perceptual adjustments operate. It seems well established, then, that the perceptual "filtering" of visual stimuli serves, in many instances, to protect the observer as long as possible from an awareness of objects which have unpleasant emotional significance for him. Does this process, however, entirely insulate him from the emotionprovoking qualities of the stimulus situation? It is to this problem that the present discussion is addressed. If we view emotion essentially as a rnptivating condition of the individual (6), the critical nature of the relationship between emotion and perception becomes apparent. Emotion does appear to represent a highly organized and directed state of the organism. Consequently emotion-inducing stimuli may be expected to initiate those perceptual responses which will be consistent with the general picture of emotional adaptation. Several exploratory investigations have indicated that the individual both perceives and reacts in a manner consistent with his emotional response to stimulation. That tension (defined as reactivity to threat, deprivation, or thwarting) will induce perceptual "accentuation" of objects previously associated with the anxietyproducing situation has been demonstrated by Bruner and Postman (2). More recently the same authors have shown that frustration, induced by sarcasm and criticism, will raise the perceptual thresholds of observers to tachistoscopically-presented words. When, on the other hand, individuals are faced with stimulus objects which are not actually threatening, but which represent for them areas of little interest or some antipathy, they also generally display raised thresholds of recognition (10). This process of perceptual "screening" apparently is acquired by the individual as a technique for organizing perceptions around value expectancies so as to produce maximum reinforcement of those expectancies. One question intrudes repeatedly into interpretations of these experimental findings, namely: "How is a raised or lowered threshold of recognition for inimical stimulus objects accomplished before the observer discriminates them