Experimental Development of Sealed-bid Auction Theory; Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion
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منابع مشابه
An Experimental Investigation of a Hybrid Auction.¤
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid ...rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. We developed an independent-private-values model that yielded various predictions in terms of equilibrium behavior and expected revenue. We then designed an experiment where in...
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Estimating bidders’ risk aversion in auctions is challeging because of identification issues. This paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to nonparametrically identify bidders’ utility function within a private value framework. In particular, ascending auction data allow us to recover the latent distribution of private values, while first-price sealed-bid auction data al...
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تاریخ انتشار 2016