Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals. JEL classi cation: D44 ; D82 ; C69 Keywords: Asymmetric Auctions; Interdependent Values; Perturbation Analysis, Revenue Equivalence. School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel, [email protected] yDepartment of Industrial Engineering and Management, Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Ben-Gurion University, P.O. Box 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel, [email protected] zCorresponding author. Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, P.O. Box 653, BeerSheva 84105, Israel, [email protected]
منابع مشابه
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- European Journal of Operational Research
دوره 206 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010