Narrowing down to open up for other people's concerns: Empathic concern can be enhanced by inducing detailed processing

a r t i c l e i n f o In three experiments inducing a detailed versus abstract processing style using perceptual (Experiment 1), motivational (Experiment 2), and social (Experiment 3) manipulations, we found that empathic concerns are enhanced in contexts associated with a more detailed processing style (i.e., local perceptual scope, prevention motivation, and low power, respectively). Hence, simple contextual changes known to impact on processing styles may influence empathy beyond individual differences. The present findings are discussed in terms of their implications for empathy research and their relation with research on mood and level of construal. Human development and physical and psychological well-being depend on the ability to function effectively within a social context, and a key component of effective social interaction is empathy. Empathy is related to a host of socially advantageous behaviors such as It promotes health after physician–patient encounters (Van Dulmen & Bensing, 2002) and improves intergroup relations (Dovidio et al., 2010). Furthermore, several psychopathologies are marked by deficits in empathy, and a host of psychotherapeutic approaches regard empathy as a fundamental component of successful treatment (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007; Farrow & Woodruff, 2007). Although empathy has so far been mostly treated as a stable investigation reported here explores the possibility that subtle contextual manipulations leading to a detailed (versus holistic) processing style enhance people's propensity to empathize with others. Such research should inform us how empathy can be facilitated. Unpacking empathy: empathic concern requires concreteness and self-other differentiation In its broadest sense, empathy refers to the reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another individual (e.g., Davis, 1983). However, empathy still remains a riddle in social In their seminal article, Preston and de Waal (2002) provide an interdisciplinary integration of theory and data on empathy and propose the perception–action model (PAM). The PAM states that at the core of empathic capacity lies a mechanism providing an observer (the subject) with access to the subjective state of another (the object) through the subject's own neural and bodily representations (i.e., perception–action links; see also de Waal, 2008). According to the PAM, when the subject attends to the object's state, the subject's neural representations of similar states are automatically and unconsciously activated, which lets the subject share its emotions and needs, ultimately fostering compassion and altruistic behavior. PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum ranging from mimicry (e. Along this continuum, …