‘ ‘ I am not guilty ’ ’ vs ‘ ‘ I am innocent ’ ’ : Successful negation may depend on the schema used for its encoding q

Negations (e.g., ‘‘Jim is not guilty’’) are part of our daily language and communication. Linguistic and non-linguistic negations can occur when receivers counter-argue what communicators are saying, when hypotheses are disconfirmed, or through negative cognitive responses and many other social interactive processes. Our study explores how negations are encoded by considering the predictions of two theoretical models. According to the fusion model, the core of a negated message and the negation marker are integrated into one meaningful unit. Thus, Jim in the example might be encoded within the schema ‘‘innocence.’’ According to the schema-plus-tag model, a negated message is represented as a core supposition and a negation tag, allowing for dissociation of the two at a later point in time. We compare the two models by examining the nature of inferences that are facilitated by negations. Our results show that the existence of a schema that accommodates the meaning of the original negation is critical in determining how a negation will be encoded. When such a schema is not readily available, processing a negated message facilitates negation–incongruent associations, in line with predictions of the schema-plus-tag model. This model is also supported by analyses of respondents memory. We discuss implications of these findings for the communication of negated information, for discounting theories, and for the assessment of the truth of incoming information. 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.