Learning under p-Tampering Attacks

نویسندگان

  • Saeed Mahloujifar
  • Dimitrios I. Diochnos
  • Mohammad Mahmoody
چکیده

Recently, Mahloujifar and Mahmoody (TCC’17) studied attacks against learning algorithms using a special case of Valiant’s malicious noise, called p-tampering, in which the adversary gets to change any training example with independent probability p but is limited to only choose ‘adversarial’ examples with correct labels. They obtained p-tampering attacks that increase the error probability in the so called ‘targeted’ poisoning model in which the adversary’s goal is to increase the loss of the trained hypothesis over a particular test example. At the heart of their attack was an efficient algorithm to bias the average output of any bounded real-valued function through p-tampering. In this work, we present new biasing attacks for biasing the average output of bounded real-valued functions. Our new biasing attacks achieve in polynomial-time the the best bias achieved by MM16 through an exponential time p-tampering attack. Our improved biasing attacks, directly imply improved p-tampering attacks against learners in the targeted poisoning model. As a bonus, our attacks come with considerably simpler analysis compared to previous attacks. We also study the possibility of PAC learning under p-tampering attacks in the non-targeted (aka indiscriminate) setting where the adversary’s goal is to increase the risk of the generated hypothesis (for a random test example). We show that PAC learning is possible under p-tampering poisoning attacks essentially whenever it is possible in the realizable setting without the attacks. We further show that PAC learning under ‘no-mistake’ adversarial noise is not possible, if the adversary could choose the (still limited to only p fraction of) tampered examples that she substitutes with adversarially chosen ones. Our formal model for such ‘bounded-budget’ tampering attackers is inspired by the notions of (strong) adaptive corruption in secure multi-party computation. University of Virginia, [email protected]. Supported by University of Virginia’s SEAS Research Innovation Award. University of Virginia, [email protected]. University of Virginia, [email protected]. Supported by NSF CAREER award CCF-1350939 and University of Virginia’s SEAS Research Innovation Award.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1711.03707  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2018