How to Boost Revenues in FPAs? The Magic of Disclosing only Winning bids from Past Auctions
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چکیده
We show that an auctioneer (such as an auction house, or a procurement agency) should disclose historical information about winning bids from past auctions, as opposed to disclosing all bids, because this induces bidders to bid more, and raises revenues. We provide a theoretical explanation for our experimental findings based on a bias: at least some subjects may miss that winning bids are not representative of all bids when processing the available information about past bids.
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تاریخ انتشار 2014