Errors upon Errors: A Reply to Joyce

In his response to my paper „The Error in the Error Theory‟ criticizing his and J. L. Mackie‟s moral error theory, Richard Joyce finds my treatment of his position inaccurate and my interpretation of morality implausible. In this reply I clarify my objection, showing that it retains its force against their error theory, and I clarify my interpretation of morality, showing that Joyce‟s objections miss their mark. In my judgement, John Mackie‟s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [1977] and Richard Joyce‟s The Myth of Morality [2001] are two of the most important and engaging books ever written about morality. It was my great esteem for them that led me to write a paper titled „The Error in the Error Theory‟ [2008], in which I tried to identify where their arguments went wrong and explain why we did not have to accede to their conclusion that all basic moral statements are untrue. I am therefore pleased to have prompted a response from Joyce [2011a]. Unfortunately, he considers my treatment of their positions inaccurate, and my interpretation of morality implausible. However he consistently misunderstands my objection and views. I am surprised to find myself misinterpreted on so many fronts, and here I can address only the most significant errors. I first reply to the charge that I misinterpret the Joyce/Mackie argument for moral error theory, by clarifying my objection. Second, I explain why Joyce‟s response fails to blunt the force of this objection. Third, I rebut Joyce‟s objections by clarifying my own interpretation of morality. 1. ‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Following Mackie, Joyce argues for error theory by first identifying a „nonnegotiable‟ conceptual presupposition of moral language and thought (the conceptual premise), and then claiming that this presupposition is incompatible with how the world actually is (the substantive premise). Joyce‟s first major complaint is that I misidentify the „poisoned presupposition‟ of morality that leads himself, Mackie, and others to error theory, and he declares „I cannot recognize myself in many of 1 Jonas Olson [2010] has also come to error theory‟s defense. His objections are largely different and aren‟t addressed here. 2 Joyce suggests I might be mistaking the commitments of moral error theory as such with the commitments of a particular argument for error theory. (I am found guilty in Joyce [2011b]). A terminological difference may be responsible; whereas he apparently understands „error theory‟ austerely, as claiming simply that all basic moral statements are untrue, I used it as incorporating views about the underlying fault in moral concepts. (But see Joyce [2001: 5]: „an error theory... involves two steps of argumentation‟). Hence I distinguished between different error theories, as we commonly distinguish between different expressivist theories, nonnaturalist theories, etc. He calls it a „major strategic weakness‟ that my paper overlooks or ignores all the other possible arguments for an error theory, since „it takes little effort to locate other possible flawed presuppositions‟. It is unlikely that any feasible strategy for defending morality in a single article wouldn‟t be „weak‟ by this standard. My objective was merely to refute the „Mackian error theory‟ [2008: 351], and I explicitly acknowledged that other error theories „would not be vulnerable to the arguments of this paper‟ [2008: 350].