wpcomunite.it ●●●○○○ Conflict of Interests, (Implicit) Coalitions and Nash Policy Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games. JEL: C72, E52, E61
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