Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
We establish the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make, discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous optimal choices for the agent. Our approach, then, is based on (and generalizes) the existence theorem of Simon and Zame (1990) designed for discontinuous games.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 66 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009