Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods

نویسندگان

  • Simina Brânzei
  • Hadi Hosseini
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
چکیده

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods using the leading notion of fairness in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely perfect substitutes and perfect complements, we establish the computational properties of algorithms operating in this framework. For the class of valuations with perfect complements, our algorithm yields a surprisingly succinct characterization of instances that admit a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

No . 16 - 1 Credit , Money and Asset Equilibria with Indivisible Goods

In a New Monetarist framework, we study the trade of indivisible goods under credit, divisible money and divisible asset in a frictional market. We show how indivisibility on the goods side, instead of the money or asset side, matters for equilibria. The bargaining solution generates a price that is independent of nominal interest rate, dividend value of the asset, or the number of active buyer...

متن کامل

Credit , Money and Asset Equilibria with Indivisible Goods By Han Han Benoît Julien

We study the trade of indivisible goods using credit, divisible money and divisible assets in a frictional market. We show how indivisibility matters for equilibria. Bargaining generates a price that is not linked to nominal interest rates, dividend value of the asset, or the number of active buyers. To reestablish this connection, we consider price posting with competitive search. We provide c...

متن کامل

Strategic Behavior when Allocating Indivisible Goods

We study a simple sequential allocation mechanism for allocating indivisible goods between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on agents behaving strategically. We view the allocation procedure as a finite repeated game with perfect information. We show that with just two agents, we can compute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in linear time. With more agents, c...

متن کامل

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases

We study competitive equilibria in the basic Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. Such equilibria fail to exist in the simplest possible market of two players with equal budgets and a single good, yet this is a knife’s edge instance as equilibria exist once budgets are not precisely equal. Is nonexistence of equilibria also a knife-edge phenomenon in complex markets with multiple go...

متن کامل

Modeling House Values: Extremal Equilibria in Allocation Markets with Non-Transferable Utility

Wealth effects impact the valuation and allocation of large indivisible goods such as houses. Yet no general method exists for quantifying these effects. We introduce an algorithm for identifying equilibria in allocation markets with non-transferable utility, thereby filling this gap. In cases with multiple equilibria, the algorithm can be used to solve for maximum and minimum equilbrium prices...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015